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DUTY OF A RAILROAD TO FURNISH SPECIAL
EQUIPMENT
The question as to when, if ever, a railway can be made to fur-
nish a shipper with special types of rolling stock, or respond in
damages for its failure or refusal to do so, came recently before the
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in the case
of Pennsylvania R. Co. v. United States et al.1 This case resulted
from an order made by the Interstate Commerce Commission requir-
ing the railway to furnish certain refiners with tank cars. The rail-
road denied the authority of the Commissior to make the order in
question, while the Commission relied on certain provisions of the
act as amended in 1906. The court held that the amendment did
not add to the power of the Commission to require railroads to
furnish cars, and suspended and annulled the order as in excess of
the Commission's statutory power. As the effect of this decision
is to make the opinion in Scofield v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., 2
Interst. Com. Cor'n R. 67, the controlling law, and as this last
case held that the sole duty of a carrier to furnish cars was that
imposed by common law, and that the statute creating the Commis-
sion did not clothe it with the power to determine the instrumentali-
ties of shipment to be employed by a carrier, or the power to require
a carrier to use in its business the kind and number of cars which
the Commission might deem necessary for a proper car service, it is
apparent that the law on the subject under consideration is to be
found in individual decisions of the state and federal courts. Deci
sions affected by the statutes2 of the several states are, of course,
beyond the scope of this note.
We are confronted at the outset with the necessity of placing a
meaning on the words "common. law" sufficiently broad to take
into consideration the difference between railway carriers and all
other carriers. At early common law the carrier was under no obli-
gation to furnish the public with special facilities, or even additional
facilities of the kind he already had; he must take what is offered
1227 Fed. 911.
2Penalty for failure to supply cars: Bond v. Wabash, etc., R., 67 Iowa
712. Points on its own line only: Houston, etc., R. v. Buchanan, 94 S. W.
199. In Texas rush of business is no defense; this is beyond police power
of state as it interferes with interstate commerce. Houston, etc., R. v.
Mayers, 201 U. S. 321; Texas and P. R. Co. v. Allen, 98 S. W. 450.
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him to carry, "if he has room for it in, his carriage."3 In Jackson
v. Rogers,4 an action on the case for refusal to carry, the reporter
calls attention to the fact that it was "alleged and proved that he
had the convenience to carry," and when Baron Parke had occasion
to review the early law on the subject in Johnson v. The Midland
Railway Co.5 he regarded the rule that carriers were not bound to
transport goods unless they had facilities for the purpose as well
established. While the doctrine that the duty to carry is coextensive
with the "holding out" may be found enunciated with more or less
clearness in many of the early cases, it is not emphasized, so that it
is difficult to derive any principle from the opinions other than this:
that the carrier must make a reasonable effort to serve the public
with what means he has at hand. Some such general principle
seems to have guided the court in an American case decided in
1841.( A shipper sued a carter for the loss of a hogshead of mo-
lasses which the defendant's servant had received for carriage with-
out the defendant's consent, and which was broken in loading
'because of the small size of the wagon. The defendant said that
the servant's act was without ihe scope of his employment. The
court ruled that to enable the plaintiff to recover he must prove
"either a special contract and undertaking by the defendant to carry
this hogshead of molasses, or a general usage; that is, that the
defendant was a common carrier of goods, including goods of this
description." So also in the case of Gordon v. Hutchinson (I Watts
and S. 285), Chief Justice Gibson of Pennsylvania said: "In England
the obligation to carry on request on the carrier's par-
ticular route, is the criterion of the profession; but it is certainly
not so with us. In Pennsylvania, we -had no carriers exclusively
between particular places, before the establishment of our public
lines of transportation, and according to the English principle we
could have no carriers, for it was not pretended that a wagoner
could be compelled to load for any part of the continent." It would
appear that the law of carriers in America in, 1840 was still in such
a formative state that the often cited passage from New Jersey
Steam Navigation Company v. Merchants Bank (1848)'that the
carrier "is bound to receive and carry all goods offered for trans-
portation,-and is liable to an action in case of refusal"a cannot be
taken without qualification.
3 Riley v. Home, 5 Bing. 220.
42 Shower 327.
,
5Decided 1852. 4 Exch. 367.
aTunnell v. Pettijohn, 2 Har. (Del.) 48.
6aG Howard 382.
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The rule laid down by Story,7 supported by citation of the usual
cases' from the early reports, that "One of the duties of a conmon
carrier is to receive and carry all goods offered for transportation
by any person whatsoever upon receiving a suitable hire," is qualified
by such important exceptions, immediately following, that it con-
stitutes an accurate, if somewhat misleading, statement of the early
common law. "If a carrier refuses to take charge of goods because
his coach is full," he says, "-or because the goods are not of a
sort which he is accustomed to carry; or because he has no conven-
ient means of carrying such goods with security; these will furnish
reasonable grounds for his refusal; and will, if true, be a sufficient
legal defense to a suit for the non-carriage of the goods." The
conclusion seems justified that the carrier was by early common law
not bound to accept for transportation goods constituting the ordi-
nary articles of contmerce unless he had the facilities at hand for
transporting them.
The business done by the early railways bore some resemblance
to that done by the owners of toll roads, canals, and private rights
of way, who provided primarily a right of passage, but the intro-
duction of steam locomotives, the consequent complication in design
of the carriages, and, lastly, the very important privileges granted
the railroads by the people soon changed the relation of this class
of carriers to the public. Perhaps the clearest statement of the atti-
tude that the courts took toward the railroads when, they came to fix
their relation to the public is found in the leading case of Kansas
Pacific Railway Co. v. Nichols9: "That railroads are created com-
mon carriers of some kind, we believe, is the universal doctrine of
all the courts. The main question is always, whether they are
common carriers of the particular thing then under consideration?
The question in this case is whether they are common carriers of
cattle? So far as our statute is concerned, no distinction is made
between the carrying of cattle and that of any other kind of prop-
erty. Under our statutes a railroad may as well be a common car-
rier of cattle as of goods, wares and merchandise or of any other kind
of property. Now, as no distinction has been, made by statute between
the carrying of the different kinds of property, we would infer that
railroads were created for the purpose of being common carriers of
7Sec. 508,
gJackson v. Rogers, supra; Rex v. Kilderly, I Saund. 312; Lane v.
Cotton, I Ld. Raym. 646; Balson v. Donovan, 4 Barn. and Aid. 32; Edwards
v. Sheratt, I East. 604.
99 Kas. 235.
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all kinds of property which the wants and needs of the public require
to be carried, and which can be carried by railroads." With the
exception of Michigan,10 the states seem to have adopted the atti-
tude taken by the Kansas court toward railroads as the proper one,
but in applying the rule that railroads were public purposes or
public uses there was much variation,.
It is apparent that as soon as it is held that a railroad must trans-
port all kinds of goods, it must then carry these goods safely. Car-
rying the doctrine forward, if special cars are necessary to carry
the goods, these must be provided. The only limitation on the doc-
trine would be that the goods must be such familiar articles of com-
merce as to raise the implication that the railroads were cieated to
carry them, or, that the roads can be said to hold themselves out as
carriers of them.
Accepting the general principle underlying the Kansas case as
the proper one in dealing with railroads, the statement made by
Hutchinson in his work on carriers appears as a clear statement of
the law. "But still there may be cases in which it cannot be known
from common experience nor from the character of the business in
which the carrier is engaged whether the particular goods are such,
that he as a common carrier, is under legal obligation to accept for
carriage, and in such cases it would devolve upon the party who
insisted upon his liability for the refusal, to show from the nature
of the employment or from the usage of others similarly engaged,
or from the previous practice or course of business of the particular
carrier himself, that the duty to accept was incumbent upon him.""1
The original practice in this country in transporting petroleum
was to fill barrels and place these in cars. The losses and danger
entailed in this method finally led to the much cheaper method (for
the shipper) of transporting in bulk in tank cars.12 The old method
was, however, never abandoned and is still in, use, in a somewhat
changed form. With the introduction of this method, and other
similar practices, tending to make alternative methods of shipment,
one better than the other from the shippers' point of view, the
question arose as to the right of the shipper to demand the better
facilities from the carriers. Two cases decided by the Court of
Appeals of Missouri' 3 in 1882 and 1883 (before refrigerator cars,
lOMich. So. and North Ind. R. Co. v. Denough, 21 Mich. 165, 4 Am. R. 466.
"lSec. 112.
12Hist. of Penna. R.
18WetzeU v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 12 Mo. App. 599; and Udell v. Ill.
Cent. R. Co., 13 Mo. App. 254.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1/iss2/9
NOTES.
the type involved, had come into very general use), can be assigned
to a middle stage in the development of the law as it stands at
present. In the latter of these the court said: "While, as we held
in the case just cited, and as the learned judge instructed the jury
in this case, it cannot be said as a matter of law that in the absence
of a special contract, the carrier is bound to furnish any particular
kind of car,--as, for instance, a refrigerator car,-yet the circum-
stances may be such that it may be a fair question for the jury
whether he acted reasonably in not furnishing such a car." It
appeared in this case that the railroad had furnished cars previously
on several occasions and that the injury complained of was the car-
rier's act in removing the produce from refrigerator cars already
furnished, to other cars affording less protection from the weather.
An earlier Massachusetts case14 (1872) is cited herein which holds
that one who ships in cold weather, unless protected by a special
contract, does so at his own risk.
In Beard v. R. Co. 15 the railway accepted a shipment of butter
which was to go south, and, owing to the warmer climate at the
destination, the butter spoiled. The railway had no refrigerator
cars, but the court held that the railway must keep the butter in
condition. "Having accepted butter for transportation, defend-
ant cannot escape liability for not safely transporting it on the
ground that it did not have cars sufficient for the purpose." The
court further held that the railroad should have iced the butter in
the ordinary cars. The shipper is not required to pack the butter so
that it will travel safely, but the railroad neglects this at its peril.
It is submitted that under the circumstances here, the railroad could
not refuse to accept the butter for shipment, so that the words
"having accepted" in the opinion, do not qualify the liability. It
further seems that a railroad, once having furnished special cars,
must continue to furnish them.1 A railroad that did not own
refrigerator cars was held liable for a failure to supply them to
shippers, when cars had previously been supplied by arrangement
with a car company, on the ground of holding out, or practically,
estoppel. As a limitation., however, on the general doctrine under
discussion, the judge in this same case holds that without the hold-
ing out, there could have been no recovery: "That the finding of
this fact was necessary to the plaintiff's right of action was very
14Swetland v. Boston and Albany R. Co., 102 Mass. 276.
1579 Iowa 518.
l0Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Geraty, 166 Fed. 10; 20 L. R. A. N. S. 310.
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plainly and clearly explained to the jury by the learned judge's
instructions."
It would seem that under this case the railway cannot be made
to furnish cars unless it holds itself out as supplying them, but it
seems probable that cars must be supplied where there is any rea-
sonable demand for them, or that very trivial circumstances will be
regarded as sufficient to constitute a holding out. This case is
flatly contradicted by a South Carolina case decided in 1902.17
"The proposition that the plaintiffs cannot recover from the defend-
ant unless he proves that the railroad company held itself out to the
public as furnishing refrigerator cars for transporting fruits and
vegetables is erroneous, inasmuch as it was only necessary for the
plaintiff to show that the defendant was a common carrier of freight,
and that the defendant refused to transport articles of freight, which
resulted in damage to the plaintiff." This case seems to put the
doctrine in the strongest form against the railway, and while the
only authority for the case cited is an earlier South Carolina case,18
which on examination appears to be nothing more than a restate-
ment of the paragraph from Story's Bailments mentioned above,
there is nothing illogical in the conclusion at which the court arrives.
The general tendency of ihe courts seems to be to require the carrier
to furnish the .shipper with equipment, which is either cheaper, more
convenient or necessary for the preservation in transit, as fast as
such new equipment comes into general use. The law extends so as
to make that equipment customary equipment. 19
27Mathis v. Southern R. Co., 65 S. C. 271; 61 L. R. A. 824.l8Porcher v. N. B. R. Co., 14 Rich., L. 181. See Npt. News, etc., R. v.
Mercer, 96 Ky. 475.
19Johnson v. Toledo, etc., R., 133 Mich. 596.
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